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 Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
There has been much discussion in recent literature regarding the earnings 
management issue. Several studies have revealed that earnings management is 
associated with earnings manipulation to conceal firms’ performance and respectively 
boost investment decisions. This study examines earnings management from the scope 
of audit quality as well as corporate governance. To proceed with the results, a 
quantitative approach was employed, using a large sample of publicly traded European 
firms for the period 2013 - 2017. Establishing the study area in the European Union, 
including Switzerland, is advantageous and tries to expand the existed literature. Our 
results are not in consistent with prior research, supporting that the documented 
hypotheses regarding audit committee size, audit committee independence and audit 
quality have significant positive association with discretionary accrual as a proxy for 
earnings quality. These associations can be interpreted suggesting that in large listed 
companies, Shareholders, Management even though Audit Committee, seemed to act 
on behalf of their benefits and welfare. Consequently, there has been much criticism on 
auditor’s services, for prioritizing profit instead of protecting the shareholders’ welfare. 
Together these results provide important insights into the proper and legal firms 
operation and suggest that even though in big and well-organized firms, many steps of 
improvement need to be done, eliminating differences and enhancing transparency. 
Progress of auditing procedure, and ethic-based policy should be highlighted and 
adopted in the short-term future, while making more difficult the feasibility of earnings 
manipulation and the possible existence of economic scandals.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Earnings manipulation as described by Healy and Wahlen (1999) became a criticized 
matter from the late 1990s to the early 21th century, inasmuch as it is a very important 
and acknowledged function in the corporate world and has a pivotal role in business 
survival and economic wealth. The demand of Auditing and Assurance is getting bigger 
and bigger, as the years come through and the corporate form of business changes and 
expands (Messier W. F. et al. 2008). As it is well-known, auditing offers integrity, 
transparency and assures that financial statements of a company are fairly and truly 
stated.  Nowadays, many transactions and financial instruments have increased 
complexity and uncertainty, making their inclusion in the financial statements, at least 
problematic, Higson, A.W. (2009). Thus, effectiveness of Auditing procedure has become 
an issue of paramount importance and consequently the determinants of audit quality 
play a significant role in the Audit Assurance. M. Defond, J. Zhang (2014) mention that 
audit quality not only improves the financial reporting quality providing the credibility 
of the financial reports but also provides greater assurance. Accordingly, they emphasize 
that in order to determine the financial reporting quality; we use different 
characteristics, for example, the firm’s size, audit fees, independent and non-
independent audit committees or the underlying economic condition of a country. In 
addition, another determinant of audit quality is the audit time. Leventis, S. & 
Caramanis, C. (2005) found that there is a positive relationship between audit hours 
spent and the company size, which is noticed to be higher for companies interested in 
equity finance and audited by big multinational audit firms.  Based on that, we can 
define higher audit quality as greater assurance that the financial statements faithfully 
speculate the firm’s underlying economic conditions. 
Important part of the audit process is the assurance of the quality of the financial 
statements by securing their accuracy and their credibility. Financial statements are the 
link of the company and its external environment, that is, shareholders, government, 
financial institutions, potential private investors, analysts, suppliers, customers etc. 
Assuring the users about the credibility of the financial reporting environment of the 
company is a very important issue. As a result, a great deal of research is dedicated on 
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the quality of the financial statements, a subject that is addressed through different 
approaches. M. Defond, J. Zhang (2014) mention the notion that the responsibility of 
the auditor is compatible with the GAAP, which require auditors to evaluate financial 
reporting quality. These standards highlight all the mandatory responsibilities that an 
auditor must comply with, judgmental including bias assuring the level of the financial 
reporting quality. 
This thesis approaches the subject of the company’s financial reporting environment 
through the concept of earnings management. Earnings management is the intentional 
alteration of financial reports from the company’s managers on purpose to misinform a 
portion of the stakeholders about the financial efficiency of the company or to influence 
certain contractual outcomes which depend on the reported results (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999). This occurs because of ownership and management segregation, which leads very 
often to information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. When a conflict 
of interests occurs between the two or the owners cannot fully perceive the goals of the 
management team then it is probable that the management team might use discretion 
upon financial reporting within the boundaries of the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards (Milgrom, P. R., & Roberts, J. D., 1992). Evidence reveals that since reporting 
earnings are linked with the value of the firm, managers tend to judgmental manipulate 
company’s financial reporting, either for example in an economic upturn managers can 
artificially depress profits for their own incentives or in an economic downturn, hidden 
reserves can be used to artificially increase the revenues of a company, camouflaging 
the deterioration of the company’s financial performance by artificially manipulate the 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.  
There are two basic ways that earnings management and in general financial reporting 
quality can be influenced. First is the level of audit quality, second is the effectiveness 
and the principals of the company’s corporate governance. In other words, there is an 
external factor related to the company’s environment, which is the ability of the auditors 
to detect and prevent earnings management practices and an internal, which depends 
by the effectiveness the internal audit procedures and the incentives of the managers 
to affect the reporting results. In agreement, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) showed that 
managers have the tendency to an earnings “bath” for obtaining a proficient opinion 
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from the auditors and they strongly advocate that there is a tremendous evidence that 
is supported with positive manipulation in the year prior to violation. 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) supported that although IFRS adoption should lead to 
convergence of the accounting policies, the existence of the legal, political and the 
institutional, in overall, system of the different countries are very likely to affect the 
accounting quality of the firms between countries.  Regarding financial reporting quality 
and financial reporting quality, there are papers discussing the impact of the IFRS 
adoption to the quality of the reported earnings. According to Capkun et al. (2016) 
several researches on the transition to the IFRS and its effects on earnings management 
did not provide clear evidence on whether that leads to greater earnings management 
or not. IFRS are structured in a way to be very flexible regarding the choices on 
accounting policies, thus providing many opportunities to firms for higher level of 
earnings management. However, the accounting system constitutes a complementary 
component (Ball, 2013) and the general result on the financial reporting quality is mostly 
determined by firms’ incentives on the transparency of their reporting (Capkun et al. 
2016; Ahmed et al. 2013). On the other hand, Barth, Landsman, Lang (2008), show that 
International Accounting Standards increases earnings quality because the standards 
are principle based, and they show strong evidence that the use of that standard is 
associated with fewer earnings’ management and significant high relevance value. 
Another research taken place in Europe showed that firm size and time did not affect 
the earnings management occurrence, but large firms with big leverage seemed to have 
a propensity in the earnings manipulation, Aussenegg, W., Inwinkl, P., & Schneider, G. 
(2009). 
Furthermore, financial crises irritate significant transformations in the economic 
environment. Dimitras et al. (2015) investigated that when countries face GDP 
fluctuations and more specific countries who face financial crisis and thus a GDP 
deterioration, are more likely to detect earnings manipulation by managers. Therefore, 
our quandary was to elicit not only to whether important indicators like GDP decline 
have crucial meaning for managers giving them the incentive to artificially manipulate 
financial reports on financially distressed companies to conceal the financial problems, 
but to also what would be the consequences if a country face economic recovery. On 
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the other hand, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) show that managers have the tendency 
to an earnings “bath” in order to acquire a qualified opinion from the auditors and they 
strongly advocate that there is a tremendous evidence that is supported with positive 
manipulation in the year prior to violation. To that extend, the current research analyses 
data from countries within the European area, focused more on those with higher 
financial power. Even though earnings management issue has been analyzed a lot 
through the years, it remains a very significant affair for companies globally. That was 
the motivation to proceed with further research combining the quality of audits, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance and the audit independence. The purpose of this 
study is to explore the factors that strengthen the earnings manipulation and to identify 
if the regulatory framework of the chosen countries enhances the transparency of 
financial statements or not. It is worthy to be mentioned that from 821 observations in 
total, the 621 coming from very dynamic countries, with the United Kingdom mostly 
highlighted.  
There has been much investigation regarding the important determinants of earnings 
management, i.e. the firm’s characteristics, audit quality and corporate governance. 
However, the existing studies have reported mixed results. This study is approached 
with quantitative methodology, collecting information from Amadeus Database, trying 
to evaluate and synthesize the findings from big listed European companies, taking into 
consideration data from 2013 to 2017. Despite the existence of this monitoring 
committee, there were many corporate failures in recent years, such us the accounting 
scandals by Tyco International, WorldCom, Parmalat etc. This has brought about doubt 
in the minds of shareholders on the credibility and reliability of financial reports. It was 
as a result of the foregoing statements that researchers consider it of paramount 
importance to examine the effect the audit committee has on earnings management. 
However, the literature relevant to the connection between audit committee 
characteristics and earnings quality is inconclusive. Some studies found positive 
relationships (Beasley et al., 2000), while others found negative associations (Lin, J. W., 
Li, J. F., & Yang, J. S., 2006).  In addition, some researchers (Nelson, S., & Jamil, N. N., 
2012) reported no relationships. 
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The results for the first hypothesis showcase the existence of  a significant positive 
influence between the audit quality and the occurrence of earnings management, as 
much as the second hypothesis indicates a strong positive link between the 
independence of the audit committee and the earnings management existence, while 
the third hypothesis reveals that audit committee size and cases of earnings 
management are associated in a positive way, as well. 
Until now, no previous study has examined the interaction between audit quality 
earnings management and corporate governance of countries with financial power 
within the European area. As it is mentioned above, for the countries who faced financial 
problems, no one disagrees with the increased tense in earnings manipulation, but there 
is no clear evidence of what results are expected for the more developed counties. As 
such, the present study contributes to the literature in various ways. The 
aforementioned chosen sample from nine countries all over the Europe, taking into 
consideration financial criteria, is pioneering. In this aspect, the current review 
emphasizes on the possibility that assured financial statements, even from big 4 auditing 
companies, may conceal earnings management on behalf of the managers or 
shareholders prosperity. 
In the next chapters, a prior literature review in analyzed, following with the hypothesis 
development and research methodology. Then, the regression model and the variables 
are extensively explained and determined, while presenting the empirical results and 
conclude with the findings of this study. The final section provides limitations and 
concluding remarks of the research. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The reliability of the financial reporting statements seems to attract several researchers 
worldwide. There is a great deal of literature review regarding earnings management 
and the quality of the audit procedure, as well as the role of corporate governance 
policies on the above. For this reason, literature review has been divided into two 
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categories regarding audit quality and reliability of financial reporting and the role of 
corporate governance and the audit committee on earning management. However, the 
categorization might not be clear in some cases since the above are part of the same 
subject in the end, meaning the quality and the accuracy of the financial reporting 
statements and the association with those with responsibility of the governance of the 
company and the auditing procedures.  
2.2 AUDIT QUALITY 
Despite of the number of the researches on the subject of audit quality, there is a great 
difficulty on defining accurately what audit quality is and how to measure it, since it 
depends on the scope of each independent research and the approach of each 
researcher (Watkins et al. 2004). According to the Financial Reporting council: 
 “There is no agreement on a common definition for audit quality that can be 
implemented as a benchmark against which actual performance can be measured” 
(Sulaiman, N. A., & Turley, S., 2011). 
However, most of the research are concentrated on the characteristics and the factors 
of audit quality, such as the audit committee size, tenure, audit fees, auditor firm size, 
as well as several other factors discussed in the international literature. The other major 
scope of the international research on the subject is the effect of the audit quality on 
earnings management.  
Based on Getie Mihret, D., & Wondim Yismaw, A. (2007), audit quality is a function of 
the expertise of staff and the scope of services provided. In addition, the audit quality is 
rather affected by the audit plan and the way that audits are planned, executed and 
communicated. To understand the link that relates audit effectiveness and the level of 
audit fees, firm performance and other factors, there is a need to go a step back and 
recognize firstly the concept of them separately.  
According to, Malik et al. (2017), during the initial years of auditor tenure, auditors 
usually have limited client – specific knowledge, consequently diminishing the auditors’ 
likelihood the he will indeed succeed in detecting a material misstatement. In other 
words, the auditors’ quality has significant negative impact during the initial year. 
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According to prior research by Myers et al. (2003), the longest the auditor tenure on 
average, resulted in auditors placing higher limits on extreme decisions of the 
management when reporting financial performance. Furthermore, they observed that 
the degree of discretionary accruals decline significantly with higher auditor tenure. This 
proposition suggests that as this relationship increases, auditors limit further 
management decisions to use accruals to increase current period earnings. On the other 
hand, on a research conducted by Deis Jr, D. R., & Giroux, G. A. (1992) found that auditor 
tenure and audit quality was negatively associated, however, it should be noted that 
their results could be questioned as their sample is incorporating only small and medium 
CPA firms. Identical research by Lys, T., & Watts, R. L. (1994) provide evidence that 
independence was decreasing the level of auditor tenure. 
Ball, F. (2013) evaluated the impact of auditor-client relations measured by the audit 
tenure as well as the subsequent discounts after the initial engagement to the audit 
quality. The study did not show any evidence of audit quality impairment arising from 
the person-to-person relationships, however that is not the case regarding the auditor 
firm and client firm relationships. In addition, the study provided evidence that audit 
fees in the years following the initial engagement do indeed increase so, as a result, 
there are not enough reasons supporting quality undermining arising from price 
pressure.  
Other auditing literature findings suggest that audit quality of Big 4 is remarkably higher 
when compared with that of non-Big 4 auditors, DeAngelo (1981). Big size firms have 
more reasons to provide a greater deal of auditing effort in order to reduce the litigation 
loss, while maintaining their independence and professional reputation. Furthermore, 
since big firms are less prone to being dependent to a single client, they have greater 
control on them and thus there are less possibilities for earnings manipulation from the 
clients. Kim et al. (2003), also came to the conclusion that larger audit firms have reasons 
to prevent or decrease the earnings management in the event of a conflict or a 
convergence of reporting incentives (income-increasing accounting choices) between 
the managers and the auditors and that there is a high litigation risk in case of failure to 
identify income restatements.  
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Dopuch, N., & Simunic, D. (1980) also support the fact that famous audit firms can 
provide greater audit quality due to the fact that they are exposed to greater 
reputational risks. Other studies showcase that reported earnings forecasts of 
companies that are audited by big size auditors are actually more accurate than non-big 
size auditors, implying more accurate financial reporting (Chen, Lin and Zhou, 2005). In 
contrast, there are also some studies which do not find any significant evidence 
supporting higher financial reporting quality and auditor size (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 
2006). Several studies have showed the connection between Big 4 firms and audit 
quality using auditors’ size as a proxy to measure audit quality. As far as the majority 
linkage of audit quality and Big 4 firms, there are those who advocate (Campa D. 2013) 
that there no strong connection between audit quality and the type of the auditor 
corresponding to the audit quality proxies investigated. On the other hand, Big 4 audit 
firms provide higher quality audits and offer greater reliability to clients’ financial 
statements than the non-Big 4 auditors. Krishnan (2003), demonstrates that Big 4 
auditors have better results at constraining client earnings management in comparison 
to non-Big 4 auditors; they find that clients of non-Big 4 auditors have higher levels of 
discretionary accruals. The literature in the same context recognizes, that based on prior 
findings, have pointed out that audit volume is primary kyra significant determinant of 
audit quality. Thus, based on prior researches that Big 4 auditors deteriorate their 
clients’ ability to manage earnings through accruals, we expect that their clients will 
chose to more real earnings management given motivations to manage earnings. This 
leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
H1: There exists a significantly negative association between audit quality and the 
occurrence of earnings management. 
As Srinidhhi and Gul (2006) proposed on their research, higher audit effort leads to 
higher audit quality that translates to better accrual quality. Their findings suggest that 
accrual quality is positively associated with audit fees, which is consistent with the 
supposition that higher audit fee does reflect higher audit effort and better judgments 
about the propriety of accruals, it is, however, not consistent with the supposition that 
audit fee is associated with economic bonding. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) reported a 
negative association between the audit fees and the probability of them meeting their 
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earnings benchmarks. Abbott et al. (2004) document increases in audit fees with client's 
risk of managing earnings upwards, resulting in earnings management surprises.  
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
The system of corporate governance is this by which companies are directed and 
controlled (Cadbury, 1992). It is directly related with achievement of the company goals 
and it is also related to the ability of regulatory initiatives to pervade the organization 
and ensure compliance with rules – that is through specifically designated officers, audit 
committees and other internal structures (Power, 1997, p. 41 DeZoort, F. (1997), has 
supported that the audit committee is responsible for the oversights regarding matters 
related to financial reporting, auditing as well as overall corporate governance. In his 
paper, he also investigated the adequacy of the audit committee and its members in 
fulfilling their roles as well as their most important oversight responsibilities. 
Regarding earnings management, Schipper (1989)1 defined it as “an intentional 
intervention in the external financial reporting process with the intent of obtaining 
private gain”. Similarly, Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999)2 state that “earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
The association of the audit committee and its different characteristics with the earnings 
management activities is part of a great deal of research. Soliman et al. (2014) through 
an empirical study of the Egyptian Listed companies concluded that the independence 
of the audit committee, the experience of its members, the audit committee meetings 
and audit quality have a negative correlation of a significant degree with earnings 
                                                             
1 Schipper, K. (1989). Earnings management. Accounting horizons, 3(4), 91. 
 
2 Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting. Accounting horizons, 13(4), 365-383. 
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managements, measured by discretionary accruals. However, the size of the audit 
committee does not present any significant relationship.    
The association of the audit committee characteristics and the quality of financial 
reporting is also part of the research of Lin et al. (2006). Specifically, the characteristics 
described are the size of the audit committee, the level of independence, the financial 
expertise of its members, its activity, and the stock ownership. The findings of this 
research support that a negative correlation exists between the size of the audit 
committee and the occurrence of earnings restatement, while the rest of the 
characteristics did not appear to present a significant impact on the financial reporting 
quality. McMullen (1996) determined the association of the presence of an Audit 
Committee and the reliability of the financial reporting statements through five 
potential consequences, measuring them as shareholder litigation claiming fraudulent 
activities by management, quarterly earnings restatements, SEC actions, and auditor 
turnover involving an accounting disagreement. The results of the study support that, 
companies with audit committees are less likely to present unreliable financial 
statements.  
The issue of audit committee independence is much debated. Corporate governance 
regarding the financial reporting environment includes also those related with the 
management of the company who are in favorable position regarding their ability to 
influence financial reporting. Lin et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between 
earnings management and various audit quality and corporate governance variables 
through a meta-analysis of prior studies. The results indicate negative relationship 
between earnings management and the variables of the corporate governance 
regarding the independence and the expertise of the board of directors, as well as the 
independence, the size, expertise, and the number of meetings of the audit committee. 
On the other hand, equity involvement of the audit committee has a certain effect on 
earnings management. Regarding audit quality, auditor tenure, auditor size, 
specialization and auditor independence (measured by fees) they present also a 
negative relationship with earnings management. Therefore, the independence of the 
audit committee plays an important role in enhancing its role in preventing 
restatements. Regarding the composition of the audit committee, the Code’s principles 
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recommend that independent directors should constitute the majority. According to the 
aforementioned discussion, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H2: There is significantly negative association between audit committee independence 
and the occurrence of earnings management. 
Karamanou & Vafeas (2005) in their research called “The association between corporate 
boards, audit committees and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis”,  
studied the association of effective firm governance, i.e. corporate boards and audit 
committees as well as quality of financial disclosing, proxied by management earnings 
forecasts. The results indicate that effective corporate governance is related with less 
information asymmetry between management and shareholder, meaning higher 
financial reporting quality. Meanwhile, disclosure policies in those firms are shaped to 
protect shareholder, especially in cases when results are worse than expected. In such 
cases, there is a high likelihood that managers will proceed with disclosure of bad news 
to the shareholders however; this is also accompanied with management forecasts, 
meaning lower accuracy on forecasts. The possible explanation for this is that well-
governed firms are more dutiful in their obligations not to mislead shareholders.   
Regarding earnings management and financial reporting quality Leuz et al. (2003) 
suggested that management practices are less likely to occur in companies operating in 
countries with developed equity markets, dispersed ownership structures, strong 
investor rights, and applications of law. This indicates investors’ protection and the right 
institutional background is an important parameter in corporate policy choices and 
earnings management activities, which is also influenced by the different institutional 
characteristics of different countries. When the appropriate legal systems exist, with the 
purpose of protecting outside investors, the possibility and the ability of the insiders to 
manipulate firm resources or reporting results is limited thus earnings management is 
limited in countries with strong investor protection policies. Finally, these findings 
support the association of corporate governance and quality of financial reporting. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H3: There is a significantly negative association between audit committee size and the 
occurrence of earnings restatement. 
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2.4 AGENCY THEORY 
The concept of agency theory to comprehend the relationships between agents and 
principals. Hussaini, B. A. L. A., & Yahaya, A. (2014) explore this concept of agency theory 
and the applications towards the development of large entities. They concluded that the 
owners of the companies have different interests with those of the directors creating a 
source of conflicts. Incompatible incentives may drive a wedge among stakeholders and 
prompt financial losses leading to agent-principal problem. Therefore, agency theory is 
considering to be relevant while it explains the audit committee which functions a 
monitoring mechanism to reduce agency cost (Menon  Williams 1994). Finally, Menon, 
K., & Williams, J. D. (1994) states that due to this separation of duties, public companies 
have the ability to attract more audit committee members in the current environment 
while it minimizes the agency problem. Overall, evidence suggests that the proportion 
of board size held by outside directors have significant relation with audit committee 
size while large boards should obtain greater monitoring benefits than smaller boards 
and should be more likely to rely on audit committee size.  
2.5 GDP VARIATION AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Cohen et al. (2008) documented the impacts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or else SOX, 
which is introduced in 2002 in the accrual and the real earnings management. While 
accrual earnings management seemed to follow an increasing trend till the introduction 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, they have started a steady decline after the its passage. The 
exact opposite effect is true about the real earnings management, which seems to 
follow an increased trend after the passage of SOX. However, the changes described are 
not solely attributed to SOX, since the increased law enforcement actions of the 
government and the higher level of investors’ and auditors’ vigilance might have also 
been part of the decrease of the earnings management activities. 
Dimitras et al. (2015), examined how the financial crisis of 2008 affected earnings 
management practices in Mediterranean countries. The study focused on non-financial 
companies experiencing financial distress situations and that have been audited by a Big 
4 company. Furthermore, their study examined also the degree of earnings 
manipulation, which is affected by the GDP fluctuations. The results show that 
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Portuguese, Greek and Spanish companies, which were audited by a Big 4 firm, had a 
negative relation with earnings managements. Conversely, Italian and Irish companies 
had a positive. Accordingly, it seems that earnings manipulation is reduced during 
recession in all of the countries of the sample except for Ireland, which presents a higher 
scope of earnings manipulation. Finally, according to Eichengreen et al. (2014), when a 
country suffers from a financial crisis, a deterioration of GDP is detected. In addition, 
they conclude that the GDP is a variable suitable for understanding whether a country 
suffers from recession or not. While there is limited empirical evidence on the 
connection that exists between earnings quality and firm valuation, theoretical and 
empirical evidence, regarding the effects of earnings quality on the cost of capital, 
suggest that earnings of inadequate quality can lead to a greater information risk, which 
in turn results in a higher cost of capital.  
 
3 DATA & METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this section, we describe the procedure for identifying companies that restate 
earnings and introduce variables which are expected to be correlated with earnings 
management. In addition, we had to exclude the rest of the EU countries while we 
describe the main characteristics that earnings quality is affected based upon 
quantitative data to explore the impact of on the earnings quality. This part of the study 
consists of the information provided by data collection as well as the development of a 
model and finally the testing of the model, with the help of the statistical tool of Gretl. 
This chapter is comprised in four sections. At first, we describe the collected sample to 
carry out our research, then we proceed by analyzing our methodology and next we 
analyze the control variables on our model and the rest of our variables. 
3.2 DATA 
In order to demonstrate how earnings management are influenced by auditors, we 
investigate an initial sample that was obtained through the Amadeus database that is 
consisted of the largest 192 European firms based on market capitalization from 2013 
 14 
 
to 2017. In addition, we had to exclude the rest of EU countries either why they did not 
meet the market value threshold or according to Gruppe and Lange (2013) it was proved 
that countries with GDP fluctuations or countries who suffers from financial crisis, tend 
to minimize the earnings manipulation. We excluded 254 observations as we noticed 
that some values in our data were missing. Moreover, our sample focuses on 9 European 
countries with emphasis on the United Kingdom, France and Germany because we 
organize our sample regarding some corporate governance system traits. Some systems 
are described by wide dispersed ownership (outsider systems), others are described by 
concentrated ownership (insider systems). We primarily focused in outsider systems of 
corporate governance (notably in the UK) while the conflict of interest is between strong 
managers and weak shareholders. However, there are differences are also rooted in 
variations in countries’ legal, regulatory, and institutional such as policies that promote 
the adoption of specific forms of governance and other institutional factors, within 
which they are being scrutinized. 
 
 
Table 1: Description of the Data Sample 
 
 
The Table 1 is describing the distribution of our sample by various classifications. In 
addition, this panel data illustrates how our sample is distributed onto 9 European 
countries, giving emphasis on the fact that more than 50% of our data is accumulated in 
         Total          821      100.00
                                                   
United Kingdom          621       75.64      100.00
         Italy           10        1.22       24.36
     Lithuania            5        0.61       23.14
       Ireland            5        0.61       22.53
       Belgium           10        1.22       21.92
       Germany           50        6.09       20.71
   Switzerland           15        1.83       14.62
        France           83       10.11       12.79
        Sweden           22        2.68        2.68
                                                   
       Country        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
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the United Kingdom and more specific the (75.64%), followed by France (10.11%) and 
Germany (6.09%). The rest of our sample is comprised from 6 countries.  
3.3 THE PROXY FOR EARNINGS QUALITY : DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The purpose of the present dissertation is the identification of the relationship between 
earnings quality and some financial and non-financial variables that have an impact on 
the company and the environment in which it operates. Thus, we proceed by estimating 
a model that can predict how firms manage their earnings based on their size, region 
and auditor’s characteristics. Earnings quality is, in accounting terms, the way of 
recognizing and reporting earnings. It represents how good the reported earnings reflect 
a company’s actual income. Companies that use conservative accounting practices are 
found to having higher earnings quality. However, earnings quality is a qualitative 
variable and can be difficult to measure. Instead, raw accruals can be used as a simple 
approximation to quantify and evaluate earnings quality. A more precise approximation 
of the earnings quality though, demands the use of the discretionary accruals. Total 
accruals can be split into two sub-categories. The first category is the non-discretionary 
accruals while the second category is the discretionary accruals. Non-discretionary 
accruals are all factors that affect the business condition under which a company 
operates, such as growth and sales. On the other hand, the discretionary part of the 
total accruals represents all management choices. In agreement with previous 
researches, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial misappropriation or 
earnings quality. Most of the preceding literature uses the Modified Jones (1991) model, 
as it was deemed preferable to other existent methods at the time, in detecting 
abnormal accruals, i.e. discretionary accruals (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Therefore, 
abnormal discretionary accruals (estimated using different ways of the Jones Model) has 
become the favored proxy for measuring managerial discretion. Various accruals 
measures have also been used for the study of earnings quality. As far as these 
investigations are concerned, (Thomas and Zhang, 2000) it is important to mention that 
earnings management and earnings quality provide evidence that extreme accruals are 
indeed less beneficial, in agreement with the audit quality literature that have been 
cited. 
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We concluded that considering the modified Jones model that is based on the previous 
research of DeChow et al. (1995) as they provided repeated evidence that this model 
produces sturdily built results both at 1% and 5% significance level. Thus, we estimate 
earnings quality through unexpected or discretionary accruals as per Modified Jones 
model, which is the difference between a firm’s total accruals and the normal accruals 
from our Equation (1): 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 𝑁?̂?  (1) 
 
Discretionary accruals (DACC) can be described as the difference between total accruals 
(TA) and non-discretionary accruals (NDA). In order to calculate discretionary accruals, 
we have first calculated total accruals (TA) as follows (Hribar & Collins, 2002). 
Accordingly, we can approach the computation of total accruals in two different ways: 
either from the balance sheet or from the cash-flow-statement. On the former, total 
accruals are calculated as the deduction of current liabilities (except the current portion 
of long-term debt) from current assets (except cash items) and depreciation. In our 
research, we have used the last-mentioned approach where total accruals are calculated 
as the difference between net income and the operating cash flows instead of the 
balance sheet as ((Hribar & Collins, 2002) described in their research. In particular, the 
estimation for total accruals and normal accruals were calculated by the following 
Equations (2), (3):  
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡   (2) 
Where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑡: Total Accrual in year t 
𝑁𝐼𝑡: Net Income in year t 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡: Cash Flow from Operating activities in year t 
Accordingly, for the computation of normal accrual we took into consideration the 
following equation (3): 
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 (3) 
 
In those functions, ΔRevenues represents the change in revenues from the current year 
to the previous year, ΔAR represents the change in accounts receivable while the PPE 
represents the gross value of property, plant and equipment during the current year. 
The average total assets of each company scale all variables in order to avoid 
heteroscedasticity problems.  
Once the model is estimated and the values of the discretionary accruals are obtained 
the construction of the dependent variable, that is the earnings quality, will be finalized. 
From there on, an effort is given to identify the relationship of earnings quality and 
financial and non-financial variable that may influence a company’s earnings. These 
variables namely are: 
 Audit Committee Size 
 Return on Assets (ROA) 
 Financial Leverage 
 Cash flow from operating activities 
 Audit Quality 
 GDP Growth 
 Audit Committee Independence 
 Accounting Practice used 
Accordingly, a cross – sectional model was used in order to estimate how earnings 
quality is affected by some characteristics such as those that are depicted on the 
Equation (4): 
 
(4) 
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3.4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
To synthesize, although assorted results have been documented, prior studies also 
include various variables which are often used to control factors influencing 
management’s incentives to manage fraudulent activities. There is an important number 
of measures of firm effectiveness and performance that is reported to be related with 
earning management (or earnings quality), which provided major insights (McNichols, 
2000). This study also highlights the financial leverage (Lev), which is measured as the 
ratio of the total liabilities divided by the total assets. Accordingly, prior investigations 
have used different types of control variables such as GDP, Leverage of the firm, Return 
of Assets and Cash flow from operations (Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Myers, 2003). It is 
proved from previous researches that the magnitude of discretionary accruals increases 
as the leverage, GDP and ROA of the firms increase. Thus, the audit quality becomes 
progressively worse. Our research also provides evidence for the effect of cash flows 
from operating activities (CFO) to capture the differences in performance across firms 
in different countries and to point out the effects of the economic activity on earnings 
manipulation. From prior research of Jiang et al. 2008, we can elicit that firms with a 
strong operating cash flow performance are not as likely to manage discretionary 
accruals upwards, since they are already performing well. In addition, the possible 
explanation to these may be because the increase in leverage, growth and ROA, directly 
affects the effectiveness and the profitability of the entities, which may become an 
incentive for the managers to use their discretion with regard to accruals (Chen, Lin, and 
Lin, 2008).  
On the world of the complex financial reporting, (IFRSs) were imported in the beginning 
on or after first January of 2005 for listed companies, advocating the concept of a 
uniform financial reporting system in which entities financial statements have to 
disclose more information, with ensuing implications about the role of external auditors, 
who are now required to verify this information. Most of the accounting standards in 
the IFRSs feel the necessity for the use of fair value measurement, as it  depends upon 
a greater use of judgement (both by management and auditor) in the preparation and 
audit of financial statements (Sulaiman, N. A., & Turley, S, 2011). Finally, (Adibah Wan 
Ismail et al. 2013) confirm that IFRS adoption is totally correlated with higher quality of 
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reported earnings. Namely, it was concluded that reported earnings in the period after 
the adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management. Below, at the Table 
2, the information of both dependent and independent control variables is analytically 
presented. 
 
Table 2: Dependent and Independent Control Variables 
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3.5 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Furthermore, besides the independent variables that we discussed above, there are 
since the financial crisis of 2008, companies worldwide and especially MNE’s are 
concentrating their efforts to be as transparent as possible and minimize the risk of 
fraud, scandals and huge tax penalties. To be capable of controlling the risk of fraud, 
special importance is given to auditing procedures. From 2002 the first regulation on 
auditing procedures were established with the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Nowadays, auditing 
committees are an important part of a company’s management. The main purpose of 
the audit committee is to provide an oversight of the financial reporting and auditing 
processes. In other words, the audit committee’s role is to identify possible threats that 
may alter the company’s financial statements and financial position and present 
something different that the real condition. The members of the audit committee are 
elected from the Board of Director. The size of the audit committee, together with its 
independence, is a factor that can determine earnings management. It is expected that 
enough members in the audit committee will have a positive relationship with earnings 
quality because it will ensure a better and more transparent workflow of the audit 
committee. In addition, empirical researches provide rather mixed evidence regarding 
the impact of the audit committee size on earnings management. Xie et al. (2003), 
highlight that there is no significant connection between audit committee size and 
earnings management. Similarly, Lin et al. (2006) discover that audit committee size has 
no impact on earnings restatement. On the other hand, there are those who advocate, 
Yang & Krishnan (2005) that audit committee size is associated negatively with the 
earnings manipulation. From our results that are presented below, we can elicit that 
there is a significant positive association (at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance) 
between audit committee size and earnings quality.  
It has been emphasized in most of the regulations, e.g., SOX., that the audit committee, 
as a part of the board of directors, is crucial in corporate governance. Overall, the 
empirical evidence documents that a strong audit committee can provide high earnings 
quality. However, different characteristics of the audit committee contribute to 
determining earnings management behavior. The committee members’ independence, 
their financial and governance expertise, as well as the higher frequency of meetings 
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contribute to the mitigation of earnings management. Nevertheless, even though the 
high tenure implies more experience, it may also allow the collusion with management. 
Similarly, a larger size might result in including more experienced members in the 
committee but at a higher cost of communication. The terms of the directors’ equity 
holdings might also align their own interests with the shareholders’ or motivate them to 
conspire with the management (Klein, A 2002). On the other hand, there are those who 
fervently advocate (Peasnell et al. 2005) that the audit committee does not affect 
earnings management behavior and that it does not create any market response 
(Peasnell et al., 2005). Finally, Prawitt et al. (2009) mention that the higher the quality 
of the internal audit, the less earnings management. 
Beyond the focus of audit size and audit independence, some studies have examined 
that Big 4 auditors are not as likely to allow earnings management to manipulate 
financial statements as non-Big 4 auditors (Becker et al. 1998). The reason for our 
investigation on discretionary accruals is that the larger the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals, the greater the probability of the management to manipulate the financial 
numbers in order to meet their needs (incentives), neglecting thus the accounting and 
financial reporting frameworks. We can elicit from prior researches (Brooks et al., 2011) 
that the lower the magnitude of the discretionary accruals, the better the audit quality. 
There are different factors that can influence earnings management behavior, such as 
the auditor’s opinion, quality, fees, effort, time, experience and tenure. The auditor’s 
opinion might provide an opinion about the occurrence and the credibility of earnings 
management. For instance, the auditor is expected to provide a qualified opinion after 
a range of occurrence of earnings management to drive a negative market response 
(Lennox, 2006). The auditor’s quality also effects earnings management, as it is largely 
associated with improved earnings quality. For example, big audit firms have more 
economies of scale and valuable reputations, which motivate more due diligence 
(Eichenseher et al., 1981). In general, the auditor’s quality depends on the business 
environment e.g., firmer investor protection policies can support the high-quality 
auditors in assuring high quality earnings. 
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4 MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The purpose of this research is to identify how earnings quality responded to changes in 
financial and non-financial figures of a company and the market it operates. Specifically, 
it was pursued to examine how earnings quality is being affected by the choice of the 
accounting practice, the return on assets, the auditor’s choice, its debt, the size of the 
audit committee and its independence as well as the operating cash flow and the GDP 
of the country it operates. The accounting practice, as analyzed in the description of the 
variables, was quantified as a dummy variable, obtaining values of zero or plus one. A 
value of zero indicates that the company used the local GAAP as an accounting practice 
while a value of plus one indicates the use of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). The Return on Assets (ROA) is used in the model to identify if the 
profitability of a company is related to the earnings quality while the use of the leverage 
ratio seeks to examine if the debt levels of a company can cause variation in its earnings 
quality. Auditor’s choice is measured and quantified as a dummy variable. The auditor’s 
choice variable obtains values of zero and plus one, depending on whether the auditor 
is a Big 4 company or not. If the auditor is a Big 4, the value of plus one is obtained. The 
audit committee variable measures how many members of the Board of Directors are 
assigned to the audit committee. Baxter and Cotter (2009), in their research “Audit 
committees and earnings quality”, suggest that a larger number of the audit committee 
is more effective and has a positive relationship with earnings quality. Larger audit 
committees include more members and thus it is more likely to have more experienced 
members, which will achieve a more precise auditing process. The number of the 
independent members of the audit committee is another variable that can assist to the 
description of the variation in earnings quality. In literature, it is supported that a larger 
number of independent audit committee members indicates a better earnings quality 
once the auditing process becomes more efficient and biased. In specific, Beasley et al. 
(2000) suggest that the independent audit committee members ensure an improved 
financial reporting. Furthermore, Dechow et al. (1995) suggest the Operating Cash Flow 
variables as a variable that could measure the variations of earnings quality. Cash flow 
from operations is a figure that is crucial for the company. It represents the company’s 
ability to efficiently manage its liquidity that is derived from its daily operations. While 
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earnings are easily managed and can differ in number depending on various reasons, 
most important of which the accounting practice used, cash is not easy to manipulate 
and can reveal useful information about earnings quality. Finally, the use of the GDP 
variable is used to account for systemic changes. The GDP variable can detect and 
measure the relationship between a country’s financial condition and earnings quality 
of companies operating in it. Using this variable, it can be identified whether companies 
that operating in a country that economically grows give a greater importance in 
earnings quality than companies operating in countries that face a recession.   
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3 represents the model’s statistic characteristics. In particular, the mean, the 
median, the maximum value, the minimum value and the standard deviation of the 
sample are being reported for each of the independent variables. The accounting 
practice and Big4 variables are dummy variable and thus the maximum and minimum 
value are plus one and zero respectively. From the analysis of the sample, it can be 
concluded that 76,53% of the companies use IFRS as an accounting practice. Regarding 
the ROA, from the companies selected, the median was 6.20% with a standard deviation 
of 11.7. The minimum ROA of the companies included in the sample is -87.8% while the 
maximum is 52.6%. Moreover, the median leverage of the companies of the sample is 
9% while the maximum value of the debt to equity ratio equals 111%. The statistical 
results for the size of the audit committee suggest that the companies of the sample 
have on average two members in the audit committee. The maximum value of the audit 
committee size variables is nine while the minimum value equals zero. In addition, the 
companies in the sample, on average had none or one independent members in the 
audit committee. The maximum value of independent members was six. The last two 
facts, lead to the conclusion that despite having recognized the importance and the use 
of the audit committee, companies do not engage third parties such independent 
members in the control of the company’s practices. Finally, the GDP variable of the 
sample shows that the companies were selected on average from countries that have 
economic growth. In particular, the median of the sample is 2.05% growth. The 
maximum and minimum value of the variable are -1.71% and 25% respectively. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of all variables in the cross – sectional model  
 
4.2 CORRELATION MATRIX AND MULTICOLLINEARITY ANALYSIS 
Table 4 represents the correlation matrix of the sample in order to identify if there are 
any unexpected multicollinearity issues in the sample.  
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
The correlation matrix reveals interesting information about the sample and the 
selected variables. Firstly, there is a 12% correlation and a 10.35% correlation between 
the accounting practices used the ROA and the Operating Cash Flow respectively. The 
DACC Acc_Prac ROA AuditQ Lev Audit_Com_Size Audit_Com_Indep OCF GDP
DACC 1 -0.2752 0.08 0.2709 -0.196 0.1939 0.1459 0.0797 0.00
Acc_Prac 1 0.12 -0.141 0.0838 0.0938 0.0214 0.1035 -0.042
ROA 1 0.0299 -0.126 0.0551 0.0383 0.0322 0.1028
AuditQ 1 0.0532 0.1725 0.1026 0.1089 0.0516
Lev 1 0.1044 0.0345 0.1489 -0.102
Audit_Com_Size 1 0.4781 0.2366 0.1078
Audit_Com_Indep 1 -0.071 0.0374
OCF 1 -0.022
GDP 1
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Return on Assets and the Operating Cash Flow, as well as the leverage ratio are the only 
variables that are actual accounting figures. The correlation between the accounting 
practice and those variables indicates that accounting figures can be easily altered and 
affected using different accounting practices. Mostly the ROA is correlated with the 
accounting practice and it can be attributed to the fact that the calculation of the ROA 
requires the accounting results of earnings and profit. Additionally, the ROA is 10.28% 
correlated with the GDP growth. The financial condition of a country seems to be 
affecting the profitability of a company. This fact, combines with the 8% correlation of 
the discretionary accruals and the ROA, could imply that earnings quality is associated 
with a country’s financial condition. Due to the positive correlation, the better the 
economic omens and condition of a country, the better the quality of the earnings of 
the companies operating inside the country’s economy. Regarding the Big4 variable 
there is a positive correlation between it and the audit committee size and the 
independent members of the audit committee, as well as the operating cash flow. The 
positive correlation with the audit committee size and its independence suggests that a 
company that uses a Big 4 company as its auditor has a larger audit committee and is 
independent. Combined with the 30% correlation with the discretionary accruals, it is 
safe to state that companies that are monitored by Big 4 companies have a better 
earnings quality and a more efficient and independent audit committee. Finally, a 
negative correlation of 10.24% is existent between the leverage ratio and the GDP 
growth while there is a positive correlation (14%) between the leverage ratio and the 
Operating Cash Flow. The negative relationship with the GDP growth is existent because 
in countries that have economic and financial growth, a raising leverage ratio reveals 
that the company under examination is facing financial problems due to inefficient 
management. On the other hand, the positive relationship of the leverage ratio and the 
operating cash flow can be associated with the fact that if a company gets more debt, 
the cash inflow is greater that the cash outflow because the main operations are 
financed by third party capital.  
4.3 RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION MODEL 
Table 3 presents the output of the regression model as performed in Gretl. The p-value 
of the F-test is equal to zero. The F-test assumes that the models R-squared is zero and 
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there is no fitted line existent that could describe the variations of the dependent 
variable. It basically assumes that the model has no explanatory power. Because the p-
value equals zero, this indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected and thus, the model’s 
R-squared exists and it has explanatory power in all significance levels. The R-squared of 
the model equals 0.2247. That means that the independent variables and the estimated 
model can describe 22.47% in the variations of the discretionary accruals that represent 
the earnings quality. In addition, looking at the p-value of the t-test of the independent 
variables, it can be concluded that all are significant. The significance column presents 
at what levels each independent variable is significant. The audit committee size and 
independence variable are significant in the 90% significance level while the GDP and 
ROA variables are significant until the 95% significance level. Besides those variables, all 
others are significant in the 99% significance level, so it can be assumed, with a 99% 
confidence that the independent variables have explanatory power. Using the output 
provided by Gretl, the model can be written as: 
 
DACC = − 0.0403266 − 0.0143045Acc_Pra + 0.000140165ROA + 0.0102195AuditQ − 
0.0263352Lev + 0.00155739Audit_Com_Size + 0.00140396Audit_Com_Indep + 
0.00OCF− 0.00121762GDP 
 
Based on the output of the model, it is concluded that the variables that cause, ceteris 
paribus, a positive change in the DACC variable are the ROA, the use of a Big4 company 
as auditor, the size and independence of the audit committee. On the other hand, the 
accounting practice, the leverage ratio and the GDP variables can, ceteris paribus, cause 
a negative fluctuation in the dependent variable, while the operating cash flow, despite 
being significant, causes no fluctuations to the dependent variable. Moreover, the 
constant is negative and, all other being equal, will cause a 4% decrease in the 
dependent variable. Finally, based on the aforementioned reasons and the output of the 
model from Gretl, the three hypothesis that were assumed in the sections 2.2 and 2.3 
can be rejected. 
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Table 5: Regression results with DACC 
 
As far as the H1 states that there is negative association between the audit quality and 
the occurrence of earnings management, we can elicit from Table 5 that this hypothesis 
is not supported while (coefficient = 0.0102195 and p < 0.0001). This is not in consistent 
with prior researches with those that examine the connection between the audit quality 
and the discretionary accruals. Furthermore, regarding the H2 and H3, that states that 
there is significantly negative association between audit committee independence and 
audit committee size with the occurrence of earrings management, again we can easily 
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highlight that this hypothesis is not supported (coefficient = 0.00140396 and p =0.0543) 
and (coefficient = 0.00155739 and p < 0.0001) respectively. This is not in consistent with 
previous studies, such as Peasnell, K. et al. (2005) and Lin, J. et al. (2006) that empirically 
describe the strong negative relation with lower levels of earnings management. 
 
5 CONCLUSION AND LIMITATION 
The audit committees’ role and the quality of audit has come under considerable 
scrutiny due to multiple corporate accounting scandals around the world. An assertion 
that is provided by the auditors contributes credibility and reliability on financial 
statements, therefore, auditors are important gatekeepers for safeguarding earnings’ 
quality and for the protection of the shareholders’ welfare. It is recommended that there 
is a strong relation between corporate governance and the effectiveness of regulatory 
initiatives to pass through the organization and ensure a better compliance with rules 
via designated officers, audit committees, and other internal structures. In the corporate 
governance arrangements, the audit committee is considered one of the most crucial 
mechanisms and is responsible for oversight of matters related to financial reporting, as 
well as auditing and the overall corporate governance to maintain their independence, 
the regulation has appointed the responsibility of managing the auditors to the audit 
committee instead of the management. In this sense, auditors are expected to avoid 
earnings management, in order to protect their reputations and avoid the costly 
litigation. Therefore, the purpose of this investigation is to present an overview of 
discretionary accruals for the largest based on the market capitalization characteristic 
European firms, during the 2013 – 2017 time period and to examine the association 
between the audit committee size, audit committee independence and the audit quality 
as a proxy of Big 4 audit firms, for 192 active listed European companies. Moreover, in 
this paper, we formulate three hypotheses tests that are in line with prior literature. Our 
evidence is not in consistent with none of these three hypotheses, while our findings 
reveal that a strong positive association between audit committee size, audit committee 
independence and audit quality with discretionary accrual as a proxy for earnings 
quality. This indicates that not only audit committee size, audit committee 
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independence is associated positively with higher levels of earnings quality but also 
audit quality provides a strong relationship with higher levels of discretionary accrual, 
thus higher levels of earnings quality. 
We acknowledge the fact that our study overall should not be taken at face value but 
rather interpreted with discretion because the research is subject to a number of 
limitations. Firstly, as far as the estimation of earnings quality is concerned, we used 
discretionary accruals as a benchmark. This estimating method of accruals could be a 
noisy proxy when trying to estimate earnings quality. Despite this fact, we took in 
consideration one of the most reliable and commonly used methods in to ensure the 
robustness of our results. Moreover, our sample size is potentially biased while it 
comprised with only listed companies which are considered to have the highest market 
cap and thus to be the leaders in their sector.  
Finally, our study contributes to the existing literature by documenting the impact of 
audit quality, audit committee size and audit committee independence to earnings 
management on European listed firms. It seems that earnings management will be of 
interest to the research community for some time, as it has always fascinated 
researchers.  
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